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Abstract
The role of the courts in the protection of human rights in any legal system is a constitutionally
sensitive one. The observance and protection of such rights articulate with many aspects of the ex-
ercise of governmental and legislative power. The value nature of human rights accentuates these
sensibilities. Some have viewed sovereign law as an essential ingredient in the make-up of national
identity, a perception which tends to confirm a presumption that legal systems, while responsive
to new pressures, are nonetheless holistic, coherent, and state-bound. National law is a rampart
against outside corruption of the national ethos. Inevitably all of this poses particular challenges
for a supranational court with jurisdiction to pass judgment on human rights compliance, directly
or indirectly, by states that are justly proud of their own legal democratic traditions. The exercise
by the European Court of Justice (“Court of Justice” or “Court”) of jurisdiction to protect the indi-
vidual from breaches of their fundamental rights is a constitutional role which trammels not only
the exercise of political power by the institutions of the European Community (the “Community”)
but indirectly (and often directly) the use of governmental and legislative power at a national level.
This constitutional role, exercised in the context of the doctrines of primacy and direct effect, chal-
lenges the ideology of a state’s legal autonomy and the associated sense of self-determination. Not
surprisingly, the Court of Justice at the early stages showed a marked reluctance to be drawn into
this area.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
The European political and legal community ("Commu-
nity") is currently holding its breath, waiting and wondering if
the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 ("Treaty" or "Reform Treaty") will
ever be ratified by all twenty-seven Member States.' The new
Treaty is the consolidation of a decade of change in the Euro-
pean Union ("EU" or "Union") whereby a new balance between
economic and social values has been recognized by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice and the political institutions. The Treaty
of Lisbon in 2007 marks a significant change in the political and
legal perception of the Union as being more than a market-ori-
ented organization, recognizing a new polity that embraces a so-
cial model. Article 2 of the Treaty refers to the concept of a
"social market economy" in which the Union is to address the
sustainable development of Europe based upon balanced eco-
nomic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social mar-
ket economy aiming at full employment and social progress as
well as a high level of protection and improvement of the quality
of the environment. 2 We see a discernible shift to recognizing a
wider set of values within the constitutional base of the Union.
This is highlighted by the ability of the Union to accede to the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms ("ECHR") and to bestow legal status upon a Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the Union. Thus, the European Social
Model that is emerging from the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 is a mix
of competition, free market, and solidarity based principles.
Most importantly, Article 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union ("TFEU") states:
* Jean Monnet Professor of European Law ad personam, University of Leicester,
UK, Barrister, Littleton Chambers, UK. The author is grateful to the participants at the
Conference "Fifty Years of European Community Law" held Feb. 29-Mar. 1, 2008 at
Fordham University School of Law, New York.
1. See generally Draft Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty), O.J. C 306/01 (2007),
cpened for signature Dec. 13, 2007 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Reform Treaty].
2. See id. art. 3, at 8.
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The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and
activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accor-
dance with the principle of conferral of powers.'
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), as
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon 2007, proclaims:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and re-
spect for human rights, including the rights of persons be-
longing to minorities. These values are common to the Mem-
ber States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and
men prevail.4
Article 10 of the TFEU, as created by the Treaty of Lisbon 2007,
states:
In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the
Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation.5
Article 10 TFEU is found in Part II of the new Treaty under pro-
visions that have a general application. It was a clause intro-
duced by the 2004 Intergovernmental conference but at first
sight appears aspirational rather than a concrete obligation.
This Article examines how an economic international
Treaty arrangement in 1957, which was openly and unapologeti-
cally aimed at trade liberalization, arrived at including such fun-
damental social constitutional values in the Treaty of Lisbon
2007. This Treaty facilitates the constitutional framework for po-
litical and economic co-operation in the newly enlarged Union
of twenty-seven Member States, setting the agenda for the next
fifty years of European integration. In making this journey we
will not be taking a nostalgic look backwards at the achievements
of the Community, but we will examine how the groundwork was
laid to lead what became the Union to recognize new forms of
fundamental values capable of international recognition. This
Article first examines the underlying sources for an antidis-
3. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 7, O.J. C 115/47, at 53 (2008) [hereinafter TFEU].
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, OJ. C 115/13, at
17 (2008) [hereinafter TEU].
5. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 10, O.J. C 115/47, at 53.
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crimination concept in Community law and then moves on to
analyze how the antidiscrimination concept has developed in the
two most influential areas where it has been used: antidis-
crimination based upon nationality leading to the concept of Eu-
ropean citizenship and antidiscrimination based upon sex, lead-
ing to a wider group of suspect classes protected under Commu-
nity law.
The use of the term antidiscrimination law is a relatively
new expression in the modern day European Community.6 The
original Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity ("EEC Treaty") of 1957 referred to the concept of discrimi-
nation on the ground of nationality in Article 7 EEC, alongside
limited references to non-discrimination in relation to trans-
port,7 agriculture,8 and taxation.9 The principle of non-discrimi-
nation and/or equality of treatment emerged as a general prin-
ciple of Community law, and within this concept, as a fundamen-
tal right in Community law, extending its reach to many areas of
economic activity where Community law applied, even though
legislative competence may not have been transferred to the
Community."0 One example of this is seen in the use of non-
discrimination and/or equality of treatment to develop the prin-
ciple of effectiveness of Community law. The Community has
very limited competence to legislate in the field of procedures
6. In deference to Roger Goebel's preference for the word "Community" over
"Union" to describe the process of European integration, I have used the word Commu-
nity in this article. See, e.g., Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession
Procedure for the Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 15,
15 (2004-05).
7. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 75, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
8. Id. art. 34(3).
9. See Firma Fink-Frucht GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Mfinchen-Landsbergerstrasse,
Case 27/67, [1968] E.C.R. 223, at 232.
10. See ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OFJUSTICE 459-511
(2006); TAmis TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAw 40-88 (2006);JoHN USHER,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW 16-20 (1998); see also Balkan-Imp.-Exp. GmbH v. HZA
Berlin-Packhof, Case C-5/73 [1973] E.C.R. 1091 (using the principle of equality as a
standard of review); Ruckdeschel & Hansa-Lagerhaus Stroh v. HZA Hamburg-St. An-
nen,Joined Cases 177/76 & 16/77, [1977] E.C.R. 1753, 7 (wherein the Court enunci-
ates the general principle of equality as a fundamental principle of Community law).
The Court has also accepted that only like situations can be subject to the principle of
equality and there may be objective reasons justifying differences in treatment. See, e.g.,
Milac GmbH v. HZA Freiburg, Case 8/78, [1978] E.C.R. 1721, 18; Royal Scholten-
Honig v. Intervention Bd., Joined Cases 103 & 145/77, [1978] E.C.R. 2037; Cordorniu
v. Council, Case C-30/89, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1853.
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and remedies in the enforcement of Community law and has ad-
hered to a principle of national procedural autonomy. Never-
theless, the Court has ruled that when applying national proce-
dural rules to the enforcement of Community-based rights, na-
tional courts must ensure that the national rules are not less
favorable than those governing similar domestic actions (princi-
ple of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible
or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Com-
munity law (principle of effectiveness).1
The principle of non-discrimination has also found its way
into principles of labor law; for example, the Court has ruled
that potential applicants for Community posts must be treated
equally,12 and free from discrimination (related to observance of
religious holidays)3 The European Ombudsman has referred
to this case law in recognizing the substantive equality of oppor-
tunity when applicants apply for posts. 4 The principle is also
seen as the basis for extending Community law rights to part-
time workers' 5 and fixed-term workers. 6 Similarly, the non-dis-
crimination principle has been used to render stability to third
country nationals who are legally residing in the Community.17
11. See Rewe-Zentralfinanz eGmbH v. Direktor der Landwirtschaftskammer Westfa-
len-Lippe, Case 39/73, [1973] E.C.R. 1039, 5; Comet BV v. Produktschap voor
Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043, 4 13-16; Peterbroeck v. Belgium, Case
C312/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4599, 12; Unibet (London) Ltd v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-
432/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-2271, 1 43; Van der Weerd & De Rooy & Van Middendorp v.
Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, Joined Cases C-222/05 & C-223/
05 & C-224/05 & C-225-05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-4233, 1 28.
12. See Elkaim v. Commission, Case T-173/99, [2000] E.C.R. 1A 101, 11-433.
13. See Prais v. Council, Case 130/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1589, 1 16.
14. See generally Decision of the European Ombudsman on Complaint 3346/2004/
ELB Against the European Personnel Selection Office, http://www.euro-ombudsman.
eu.int/decision/en/043346.htm; Decision of the European Ombudsman on Complaint
3278/2004/ELB Against the European Parliament, http://ombudsman.europa.eu/
decision/en/043278.htm.
15. See Council Directive No. 97/81/EC, O.J. L 14/9 (1998), 11.
16. See generally Council Directive No. 1999/70/EC, O.J. L 175/43 (1999); see also
Impact v. Minister for Agriculture and Food et al., Case C-268/06 (ECJ Apr. 15, 2008)
(not yet reported) (holding that public sector employees can rely on the direct effect of
the non-discrimination principle found in Clause 4 (1) of the Framework Agreement
since the Framework Agreement is an integral part of the Directive to which it is an-
nexed).
17. See generally Council Directive No. 2003/109/EC, O.J. L 16/44 (2004).
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II. INFLUENTIAL SOURCES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNION
Many of the international and regional human rights trea-
ties that have attracted the signature and participation of the
Member States have included antidiscrimination and equality
clauses."8 The Community has also been at the forefront of the
1995 Beijing Conference on Women. These international fora
form part of the cultural heritage of fundamental rights which
have influenced the decisions of the European Courts in antidis-
crimination disputes and formed part of the basis of the written
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.19 The European
Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court") has also drawn upon these
sources in developing its general principles of Community law.20
Likewise, the Court has referred to national constitutions2' as
sources for fundamental rights and, in the modern era, with de-
velopments in networking, it is easier for the Community and
national legal systems to communicate directly regarding the de-
velopment of antidiscrimination law.2 2
18. See generally Yota Kravaritou, Equality Between Men and Women (Article 23), in Eu-
ROPEAN LABOR LAW AND THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Brian Bercusson
ed., 2002).
19. See generally ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHTS: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (Tamara K. Hervey & Jeff Kenner eds., 2003);
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rghts, O.J. C 303/17 (2007).
The Charter was proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Com-
mission on December 12, 2007. Once the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 is ratified, the Charter
will have legally binding status, but will not be incorporated into the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union ("TEU") or the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union ("TFEU").
The Advocates General have referred to the Charter in their Opinions; however, the
Court has referred to it infrequently and to date has not upheld a substantive funda-
mental right. See, e.g., Parliament v. Council, Case C-540/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5769, 4;
Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, Case C-303/05, [2007]
E.C.R. 1-3633, 46; Unibet (London) Ltd v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007]
E.C.R. 1-2271, 37; Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05,
[2007] E.C.R. 1-10779, 43; Promusicae v. Telef6nica de Espafia SAU, Case C-275/06,
slip op., I I (ECJJan. 29, 2008) (not yet reported); Dynamic Median Vertriebs GmbH v.
Avides Media AG, Case C-244/06, slip op., 41 (ECJ Feb. 14, 2008) (not yet reported).
20. See, e.g., Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 3), Case 149/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1365, 99 27-
28 (referencing the European Social Charter and International Labor Organization
("ILO") Conventions); Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, 91 13 (refer-
encing the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms ("ECHR")); Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 91 18 (refer-
encing the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
21. See Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Plafz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, 91 3-5.
22. See generally CASES MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND IN-
TERNATIONAL NON-DISCRIMINATION LAw (Dagmar Schiek et al. eds., 2007).
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III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AS A SOURCE OF
COMMUNITY LAW
The most influential set of international conventions that
have been sources of antidiscrimination law for the Community
include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (1966), the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women (1953), along with the 1979 Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Equally
there are a number of influential Declarations: the Declaration
of the Rights of the Child (1959), the Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination against Women (1967), the Declaration
on the Rights of Disabled Persons (1975) and the Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief (1981).
The International Labour Organization ("ILO") has played
a prominent role in developing the principle of non-discrimina-
tion in the field of employment. In its earliest Constitution of
1919, the right to equal treatment was recognized. Further ex-
amples of the antidiscrimination principle are found in the Pre-
amble, which refers to the need for recognition of the principle
of equal remuneration for work of equal value, a forerunner of
the present equal pay for work of equal value clause, currently
found in Article 141 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community ("EC" or "EC Treaty"). 23
Later amendments to the Constitution, such as the 1944 Declara-
tion of Philadelphia, which was incorporated into the ILO Con-
stitution, affirmed that the principle of non-discrimination is in-
tended to be "fully applicable to all peoples everywhere .... 4
This can also be seen in Article 2 of the Declaration of Philadel-
phia:
[A] 11 human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have
the right to pursue both their material well-being and their
spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity,
23. See Constitution of the International Labor Organization ("ILO"), pmbl., 1944
[hereinafter ILO Constitution], available at http://training.itcilo.it/ILS/foa/library/
constitution/iloconst-en.html#annex; Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, art. 141, O.J. C 321 E/37 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
24. ILO Constitution, Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the Inter-
national Labor Organization, Annex, art. V [hereinafter Declaration of Philadelphia].
20091
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of economic security and equal opportunity.
25
Over time, the ILO has moved towards recognizing a set of fun-
damental principles in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work 1998.26 Two Conventions are cen-
tral to these principles: the Equal Remuneration Convention
Number 100 in 1954 and the Employment and Occupation Con-
vention Number 111 in 1958.27 Convention Number 122, the
Employment Policy Convention of 1964, is also regarded as a
"priority Convention" that States are urged to ratify because of
its role in the functioning of international labor markets. More
recently Conventions have focused on part-time work and do-
mestic work, areas where the Community has also attempted reg-
ulation.28
IV. REGIONAL CONVENTIONS
In the international arena, we have seen the emergence of a
more focused development of European regional human rights
norms. These too have played a role in the ECJ's case law and
the creation of the written Charter of Fundamental Rights.2 9
The most influential European source of rights for antidis-
crimination measures and reliance on case law is the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
25. Id. art. 2.
26. See ERIKA SZYSZCZAK, EC LABOR LAw 77-106 (2000); see generally BOB HEPPLE,
LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE (2005); see also BOB HEPPLE, RIGHTS AT WORK: GLOBAL,
EUROPEAN AND BRITISH PERSPECTIVES 57 (2005)
27. However, there are many Conventions that impact the realization of antidis-
crimination as a principle. See, e.g., Convention (No. 156) concerning Equal Opportu-
nities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers with Family Responsibilities,
Aug. 11, 1983, available at http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=4193&
URLDO=DOPRINTPAGE&URLSECTION=201.html; Maternity Protection Conven-
tion (No. 183), June 15, 2000, available at www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/reportforms/
pdf/22e183.pdf; Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) Con-
vention (No. 159), June 20, 1983, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/
convde.pl?C159; Equality of Treatment (Accidents Compensation) Convention (No.
19), June 5, 1925, available at http://www.ilo.int/ilolex/cgi-lex/pdconv.pl?host=status
01 &textbase=iloeng&document=20&chapter= 1 &query=% 23subject%3D 13&highlight=
&querytype=bool&context=0; Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention (No.
118), June 28, 1962, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C1 18.
28. See, e.g., Part-time Work Convention (No. 175), June 24, 1994, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C175; Home Work Convention (No.
177), June 20, 1996, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C177.
29. See, e.g., Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491.
ANTIDISCRJMINATION LAW IN EUROPE
doms.3 ° Article 14 ECHR contains a wide-ranging obligation:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status. 31
All of the Member States are signatories of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. Article 14 ECHR covers similar
grounds as Article 13 EC, but also extends its protection to dis-
crimination on grounds of birth status.32 Also, Article 14 ECHR
is limited insofar as it can only be invoked when used in conjunc-
tion with a substantive ECHR right, including rights contained
in the Protocols to the ECHR."3 In recent years this limitation
has been ameliorated by the introduction of Protocol 12,
adopted in June 2000 and entering into force on April 1, 2005,
which creates a free standing antidiscrimination provision for
those Member States which have ratified the Protocol. 4 Article
1 declares:
General prohibition of discrimination
1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be se-
cured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public author-
ity on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.31
The European Social Charter ("ESC") 36 has assumed greater sig-
30. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
31. Id. art. 14.
32. See id.; EC Treaty, supra note 23, art. 13, OJ. C 321 E/37.
33. See ECHR, supra note 30, Protocols.
34. See id. Protocol No. 12. At the time of writing June 2008), only six of the
Member States had ratified Protocol No. 12: Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Romania, and Spain. See Claudia Tavani, Keeping the Criminality Myth Alive:
Stigmatisation of Roma through the Italian Media, European Roma Rights Centre, http://
wwv.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2168 (explaining that Italy has not yet ratified Protocol 12
of the ECHR).
35. ECHR, supra note 30, art. 1.
36. See generally European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinaf-
ter ESC]; DAVID HARRIS &JOHN DARCY, THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: THE PROTEC-
TION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2001).
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nificance as a result of its mention in ECJjudgments 7 and refer-
ence to it in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.3" However, the ratification of the ESC has been mixed
across the EU. The ESC, which was signed in 1961, aims to pro-
tect a wide range of social rights. Therefore, its coverage was
much greater than the comparable attempts at the EU level.
The focus of protection has been upon employment, education,
housing, social security, and healthcare, but the original ESC
only mentioned non-discrimination in its Preamble. The later
version of the ESC, signed in 1996, changed this focus, drawing
upon Article 14 ECHR. Article E of the ESC states:
[T]he enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
health, association with a national minority, birth or other sta-
tus."
The increased prominence of the ESC has sprung from the
growing practice of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
and trade unions to instigate collective claims 4° under the ESC;
creating a new form of "case law" on discrimination.41
At the practical level, the Community does not work in isola-
tion and is receptive to developments in antidiscrimination con-
cepts at the national and international levels. However, the over-
lapping of the individual litigant and the representative litigant,
for example a nongovernmental organization, is faced not only
with polycentric decision-making when trying to influence policy
development but also a choice of legal fora for concurrent ave-
37. In fact, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") referred to the European Social
Charter ("ESC") in its early case law on fundamental rights in the Defrenne v. Sulena
litigation. See Defrenne v. Sabena, Case 149/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1365, 1 28.
38. See Mark Bell, Walking in the Same Direction? The Contribution of the European
Social Charter and the European Union to Combating Discrimination, in SOCIAL RIGHTS IN
EUROPE 261, 268 (Gr-inne de Btirca & Bruno de Witte eds., 2005); see generally Gerard
Quinn, The European Social Charter and EU Antidiscrimination Law in the Field of Disability:
Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose, in SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE 279
(Grdinne de Btirca & Bruno de Witte eds., 2005).
39. ESC, supra note 36, Pt. V, art. E.
40. See Mark Bell, Combating Discrimination through Collective Complaints under the Eu-
ropean Social Charter, 3 EUR. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION L. REv. 13, 13 (2006).
41. One of the most important break-through cases is a decision against France
finding that insufficient resources had been provided for the education of children and
adults with autism to establish discrimination on the grounds of disability. See generally
Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint No. 13/2002, Nov. 4, 2003.
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nues of litigation. On the one hand, such opportunities for ac-
tion may be beneficial, for example a recent decision of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights ("ECHR Court") on segregation
in the schooling of Roma children, D.H. v. Czech Republic, drew
heavily on international conventions and the Community case
law on antidiscrimination to find statistical evidence showing
that a Roma child was twenty-eight times more likely to be edu-
cated in a school for children with learning disabilities.42 This
was a form of discrimination outlawed by the ECHR. The ruling
is a landmark judgment in terms of advancing the undeveloped
jurisprudence on race and ethnic discrimination under Commu-
nity law, the use of statistical evidence in proving discrimination,
as well as opening up the possibilities of using the ECHR in
other areas.43
On the other hand the competing choice of fora may
stretch resources when trying to operate on so many legal and
political fora. Pursuing different legal strategies may result in
different legal outcomes and may not provide a holistic remedy
for the individual.44 Similarly the lack of coordination between
NGOs in Europe may result in different priorities with compet-
ing policies being pursued with the national governments and
the political supra-national institutions.
42. D.H. v. Czech Republic, Application 5732/00, slip op., 45 (Eur. Ct. H.R.,
judgment delivered Nov. 14, 2007) (not yet reported) (known as the "Ostrava" case).
43. See generally Olivier de Schutter & Julie Ringelheim, Ethnic Profiling: A Rising
Challenge to European Human Rights Law, 71 MOD. L. REv. 358 (2008).
44. See generally Nicholas Bamforth, Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination Under EU
Law and the European Convention on Human Rights: Problems of Contrast and Overlap, CAM-
BRIDGE Y.B. EUR. L. 1 (2006-07) (comparing Community law and ECHR law on antidis-
crimination). Bamforth concludes that Community law can be directly effective and be
used to disapply national legislation, whereas ECHR rights are not directly effective and
what is required by means of a remedy is a flexible notion of an "adequate remedy."
The ECHR allows for new categories of discrimination to be read into Article 14 ECHR,
whereas Community law does not offer the same opportunities (at least in relation to
Article 13 Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC" or "EC Treaty"). There
are differences between the two systems on the kinds of norms and acts which may be
subject to review. The ECHR contains a "margin of appreciation" principle which has
no direct correlation in Community law. Community law has long recognized a con-
cept of indirect discrimination but this has only recently been recognized in the ECHR.
There are differences in the way the ECJ and the ECHR Court interpret the principles
of proportionality and justification. The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon facilitates the accession
of the European Union ("EU") to the ECHR and, if this occurs, differences between the
two fundamental rights regimes may be ameliorated.
2009]
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V. ANTIDISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS
OF NATIONALITY
Antidiscrimination on the grounds of nationality has been
described by Takis Tridimas as the "keystone of integration. 45
The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality
was found primarily in the free movement provisions of Article
48(2), 52, and 60 of the EEC and Regulation 1612/68/EEC.46
The ECJ recognized both direct and indirect discrimination, the
latter creating a new basis on which sex discrimination concepts
could later move away from formal notions of equality to sub-
stantive forms of equality. In its case law the ECJ used the non-
discrimination on ground of nationality provision to create the
early notions of "citizenship" that later found expression in the
interpretation of the Citizenship provision of Article 18 EC, com-
bined with the non-discrimination on grounds of nationality pro-
vision now found in Article 12 EC.4 7 Much of the early case law
on the free movement of goods used discrimination as the basis
for the finding that a national measure was a hindrance to inter-
state trade.4" Thus, the economic nature of the non-discrimina-
tion principle is openly recognized by Advocate General Jacobs
in his Opinion in Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgessellschaft mbH,49
where he states that:
The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality
is the single most important principle of Community law. It is
the leitmotiv of the EEC Treaty.5°
45. TAis TRiDiMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAw 76 (2d ed. 2006).
46. See EEC Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 48(2), 52, 60; Commission Regulation No.
1612/68/EEC, O.J. L 257/2 (1968).
47. See, e.g., Cowan v. Tr6sor Public, Case 186/87, [1989] E.C.R. 195; Forcheri v.
Belgium, Case 152/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2323; Gravier v. City of Liege, Case 293/83,
[1985] E.C.R. 593; Data Delecta Aktiebolag v. MSL Dynamics Ltd, Case C-43/95, [1996]
E.C.R. 1-4661, 9 16-17; Weiser v. Caisse Nationale des Barreaux Franiais, Case C-37/
89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2395, 6 (equal treatment was not necessarily limited to national-
ity).
48. See G. Marenco, Pour une Interpretation Tradionnelle de la Notion de Mesure
d'Effet Equivalent A une Restriction Quantitative, 20 CDE (1984), at 291; see also
Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case C-8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837; Union Royale Belge
Des Societes De Football Association (ASBL) v. Bosman, Case C-415/93, [1995] E.C.R.
1-4921, 117, 146 (wherein the European Court of Justice moved beyond a non-dis-
crimination principle to review measures which are or may be a hindrance to trade).
49. See Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Joined Cases C-92/92 & C-
326/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5145.
50. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft
mbH, Joined Cases C-92/92 & C-326/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5145, 91 9.
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Advocate GeneralJacobs also sees a social side to the principle in
that it is part of an embryonic citizenship whereby citizens have
common aspirations as well as rights. In a later case Advocate
General Jacobs stated:
Freedom from discrimination on grounds of nationality is the
most fundamental right conferred by the Treaty and must be
seen as a basic ingredient of Union citizenship.51
The ECJ has taken a mixed response to the principle of discrimi-
nation on the grounds of nationality. The ECJ refused to recog-
nize the idea of reverse discrimination whereby its own nationals
could be placed in a worse position than nationals of another
Member State who had exercised their rights to free move-
ment.5 2 The concept of non-discrimination was limited in pro-
moting market integration, with the ECJ moving beyond the
concept of antidiscrimination on the grounds of nationality to
protect the right to free movement generally53 and to recognize
a general right of access to economic activity that can trigger
Community law.54 It was also the ECJ that limited the potentially
wide application of this measure which could have addressed is-
sues of race discrimination, alongside ethnic and minority rights
discrimination, instead limiting it to protect only nationals of
one of the Member States of the EEC, and later nationals cov-
ered by one of the external Treaty arrangements made with
third states which allowed for access to the EEC market of goods
or persons. 55 This limited approach emphasized the significance
of being a "privileged" citizen by holding the nationality of one
of the Member States when later using the new "citizenship" pro-
visions introduced by the 1992 Treaty on the European Union
51. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bickel & Franz, Case C-274/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-7637, 24.
52. See, e.g., Morson v. Netherlands, Joined Cases 35-36/82, [1982] E.C.R. 3723.
53. See, e.g., Corsica Ferries Italia Sri v. Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, Case
C-18/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1783; D'Hoop v. Office National de l'Emploi, Case C-224/98,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-98, It 15-16; K6bler v. Austria, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-10239,
77.
54. See generally Union Royal Belge des Socit6s de Football Association ("ASBL")
v. Bosman, Case C-415/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921; see also Commission v. Denmark, Case
C-464/02, [2005] E.C.R. 7929, I 34-36.
55. See Steve Peers, Towards Equality: Actual and Potential Rights of Third-Countiy Na-
tionals in the European Union, 33 COMMON MKr. L. REv. 7, 21-24 (1996). Note that the
agreements with Turkey, Morocco, and Algeria have been the major sources of litiga-
tion.
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(also known as the Maastricht Treaty).6 The ECJ used Article
12 EC in conjunction with Article 18 EC to create a core Euro-
pean "citizenship" right.57  In Grzelczyk v. Centre Public dAide
Sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (CPAS) the Court proclaimed:
Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of
nationals of the Member States.58
VI. CITIZNSHIP
Citizenship is the most dynamic and evolving aspect of an-
tidiscrimination on the grounds of nationality. Non-discrimina-
tion is an essential component of the citizenship idea that has
emerged from Articles 12, 17, and 18 EC and the Citizen's Rights
Directive.59 The core of the citizenship right is the right to free
movement between, and within, the Member States and the
right to equal treatment with host state nationals. The principle
embraces both direct and indirect discrimination 6° and extends
beyond immigration rights to cover equal treatment in respect
to social and welfare benefits.61 These essential economic rights
underpin the fundamental freedoms and values of the original
Common Market.62 More recently the Court has refined the
concept of non-discrimination in that it extends to cover dis-
crimination on the grounds that a citizen has exercised the right
to free movement.63 The right extends not only to nationals of
the Member States but also gives limited rights to their
56. Treaty on European Union, O.J. C 191/1 (1992).
57. See generally Martfnez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R.
2691.
58. Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignies-Louain-la-Neuve
(CPAS), Case C-184/99, [2001] E.C.R. 6193, 31.
59. Compare EC Treaty, supra note 23, arts. 17, 12, 18 OJ. C 321 E/37, with the
Council Directive No. 2000/43/EC, art. 3(2), O.J. L 180/22, at 24 (2000) ("This Direc-
tive does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality .... ).
60. See Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, Case 152/73, [1974] E.C.R. 153, 11; see
also O'Flynn v. Adjudication Officer, Case C-237/94, [1966] E.C.R. 2617, 17; Groener
v. Minister for Educ., Case 379/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3967. The legitimacy of a discrimina-
tory policy relies on the principle of proportionality. In Groener v. Minister far Education,
for example, a language requirement for school teachers was justified as a legitimate
cultural policy. See Groener, [1989] E.C.R. 3967, 9 19.
61. See Martinez Sala, [1998] E.C.R. 2691, 1 63.
62. See Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98, [2000]
E.C.R. 4139, 1 45 (noting that the principle of non-discrimination applies not only to
the Member States but also to employers).
63. See D'Hoop v. Office national de l'emploi, Case C-224/98, [2002] E.C.R. 6191,
1 34-36; see also Volker Grafv. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, Case C-190/98, [2000]
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dependants irrespective of their nationality.64 It is also limited
since real opportunities for integration into the receiving Mem-
ber State may also entail positive measures to make that right a
reality.
VII. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
The most developed area of antidiscrimination law is the
development of the principle in relation to non-discrimination,
first developed in relation to gender discrimination, and now, by
virtue of Article 13 EC, extended to the suspect classes of race,
sexual orientation, age, religion or belief, and disability.65 This
is not an exhaustive list and does not include the contentious
classes of "social" or "birth" status.
The idea of antidiscrimination in the EU has developed pri-
marily through case law and embraces a range of concepts and
ideas of non-discrimination, equal treatment, equality, as well as
a duty of mainstreaming equal opportunities policies through all
Community policies. While litigation raises issues of substance
and substantive law, the antidiscrimination principle on grounds
of sex extends also to policy-making (including the use of soft
law and the open method of co-ordination ("OMC") used in the
Lisbon process), the role of procedures, enforcement and reme-
dies.
Article 119 EEC, the bedrock on which the gender antidis-
crimination principle has emerged, did not refer to antidis-
crimination but referred to the principle of "equal pay for equal
work," amended to include the principle of "equal pay for work
E.C.R. 493; Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskinainen Vakuutusyhtio, Case C-224/02, [2004]
E.C.R. 5763, 1 18.
64. See Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-60/00, [2002]
E.C.R. 627, 38 ("[1]he Community legislature has recognized the importance of en-
suring the protection of the family life of nationals of the Member States in order to
eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
Treaty ...."); see also Zhu v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-200/02, [2004]
E.C.R. 9925; Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Akrich, Case C-109/01, [2003] E.C.R.
1-9607;Jia v. Migrationsverket, Case C-1/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1. However, the right does
not extend to reverse discrimination when there is no link with the exercise of a Com-
munity law right. See, e.g., Uecker v. Land-Nordrhein-Westfalen,Joined Cases C-64/96 &
C-65/96, [1997] E.C.R. 3171, 23; Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003]
E.C.R. 11613, 26. But see Nerkowska v. Zaklad Ubezpieczefi Spolecznych Oddzial w
Koszalinie, Case C-499/06 (ECJ May 22, 2008) (not yet reported).
65. See EC Treaty, supra note 23, art. 3(2), O.J. C 321 E/37.
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of equal value" by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 (now Article
141 EC).6 6 Through the Court's case law the concept was ele-
vated to a fundamental right and continues to be seen as one of
the foundations of the Community.6 7 Article 119 EEC, was ini-
tially and essentially a competition law provision stating a princi-
ple of equal pay for equal work. It was included at the insistence
of France to prevent Member States without such a social clause
using cheap female labor to undercut the more progressive
Member States who did have such a clause.6" Noticeably it did
not include the wider ILO concept of equal pay for work of
equal value. The equal pay for equal work principle was devel-
oped by the Court in a series of test cases involving Defrenne v.
Sabena.69 The Court set out a number of basic principles which
have survived and evolved and formed the basis for a wider plat-
form of non-discrimination rights. These include the doctrine
of horizontal direct effect, the fact that sex equality is a funda-
mental right of Community law, the application of Article 119
EC to all forms of pay discrimination, including discrimination
found in collective agreements and legislation.
In 1997, Article 119 EEC was revised to accommodate the
body of case law that had emerged. In the form of Article 141
EC, it expanded to include the concept of "equal pay for work of
equal value," to create a legal base to develop further antidis-
crimination measures and to allow the permissive use of positive
action.7 °
The creation of a legal base for further antidiscrimination
measures was potentially an important symbolic move since the
political thrust to widen the ambit of antidiscrimination protec-
tion was limited by the need to use either the legal base of the
Internal Market, Article 94 EC, or the broad residual legal base
66. See id. art. 141; Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts
art. 141, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
67. See, e.g., Brunnhofer v. Bank der Osterreichischen Postsparkasse AG, Case C-
381/99, [2001] E.C.R. 496, 28.
68. See generally Erika Szyszczak, Pay Inequalities and Equal Value Claims, 48(2) MOD.
L. REv. 139 (1985) (account of the early history of Article 119 Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty" or "EEC")).
69. On the background of the test case strategy, see CATHERINE HosKi's, IN TE-
GRATING GENDER: WOMEN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 90-93 (1996) and
ERIKA SzyszczAK, EC LABOR LAW (2000) (on the lasting impact of the cases).
70. See EC Treaty, supra note 23, art. 141, O.J. C 321 E/37; EEC Treaty, supra note
7, art. 119.
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of Article 308 EC with both measures requiring unanimous
agreement in the Council. Thus beginning with the second
Defrenne case until 1997 only five pieces of secondary legislation
were adopted: a Directive on equal pay,7' a Directive on equal
treatment,72 a Directive on equality in social security,73 a Direc-
tive on occupational social security7 ' and a Directive addressing
equal treatment for the self-employed. 5 In 2004 a new Directive
was adopted addressing access to the supply of goods and ser-
vices. 76 The legislation and case law was consolidated and
brought together in a functional manner in a re-casting Direc-
tive, European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/54/EC.
77
From these rather meager legal bases the Court was able to cre-
ate evolving generations of case law addressing, not only substan-
tive legal rights and concepts, but also procedural rights and
ideas of effective sanctions and remedies.7 8 In 1995, the United
Nations Women's Conference in Beijing called for the use of
gender mainstreaming' and the Community quickly addressed
this call in a Communication from the Commission in 199680
71. Council Directive No. 75/117/EEC, O.J. L 45/19 (1975).
72. Council Directive No. 76/207/EEC, O.J. L 39/40 (1976). In 2002, this Direc-
tive was revised to bring it up to date with the Court's case law. See Council Directive No.
2002/73/EC, O.J. L 269/15 (2002).
73. Council Directive No. 79/7/EEC, O.J. L 6/24 (1979).
74. Council Directive No. 86/378/EEC, O.J. L 225/40 (1986).
75. Council Directive No. 86/613/EEC, O.J. L 359/56 (1986).
76. Council Directive No. 2004/113/EC, O.J. L 373/37 (2004); see generally Euge-
nia di Caracciolo di Torella, The Goods and Services Directive: Limitations and Opportuni-
ties, 13 FEMINIsT LEGAL STUD. 337 (2005).
77. See generally Council Directive No. 2006/54/EC, O.J. L 204/23 (2006). The old
texts remain in force until 2009. Burrows and Robinson note that the political recast-
ing missed an opportunity to recast the equal opportunities/antidiscrimination policy
into a human rights concept as well. See generally Noreen Burrows & Muriel Robinson,
An Assessment of the Recast of Community Equality Laws, 13 EUR. LJ. 186 (2007).
78. See generallyJoNAs MALMBERG ET AL., ErtcrrivE ENFORCEMENT OF EC LABOR LAw
(2003).
79. Gender mainstreaming has been defined by the Council of Europe as: "the
(re)organization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so
that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all
stages, by actors normally involved in policy-making." Council of Europe, Group of Spe-
cialists on Mainstreaming, Final Report: Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework,
Methodology and Presentation of Good Practices, Pt. I, § 3 (May 1998), available at http://
www.gendermainstreaming-planungstool.at/-lccms_/downloadarchive/00003/Europa
rat.pdf.
80. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Incorporating Equal
Opportunities for Women and Men into All Community Policies and Activities, COM
(96) 67 Final (Feb. 1996).
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and in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam by introducing Article
3(2) EC. The use of mainstreaming has received mixed re-
sponses, from those who see it as a significant policy tool81 to
those who argue it masks the use of more pro-active measures in
favor of women.8 2
Each piece of legislation was agreed by consensus only by
creating exemptions for sensitive areas, most notably equality in
social security issues, differences in state pension ages, the spe-
cial protection of maternity provisions for women and provisions
relating to positive action and protective legislation. This hard
law, however, was merely the tip of the iceberg. Accompanying
and under-pinning the legislation was a plethora of soft law in
the form of Action Plans, Resolutions, and Recommendations
moving towards more recent ideas of Roadmaps8 3, Framework
Strategies, 84 and the European Pact for Gender Equality (2006),
culminating in the designation of the year 2007 as the European
Year of Equal Opportunities for All. Using "softer" techniques
the Community has resulted in the penetration into a number of
areas of non-economic activity which would normally be within
the domain of Member State competence, particularly in poli-
cies relating to domestic violence and women's health. It has
allowed a gentle transition from a focus upon labor law rights to
labor market policies and a focus upon reconciliation of work
and family life measures. Arguments have been made that the
transnational policy learning and exchange of experience under
the Antidiscrimination Action Programme has created a hori-
zontal learning program that has led to the Europeanization of
antidiscrimination policies.85 In 2007 a European Institute for
Gender Equality was established by a European Parliament and
Council Regulation, its purpose being to support legislative and
81. See generally Mark. A. Pollack & Emile Hafner-Burton, Mainstreaming Gender in
the European Union, 7J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 432 (2000).
82. See generally Maria Stratigaki, Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action: An Ongoing
Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy, 12 EUR. J. WOMEN'S STUD. 165 (2005).
83. See generally Commission of the European Communities, A Roadmap for Equal-
ity Between Women and Men 2006-2010, COM (2006) 92 Final (Mar. 2006).
84. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Commu-
nity Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001-2005): Proposal for a Council Deci-
sion on the Programme Relating to the Community Framework Strategy on Gender
Equality (2001-2005), COM (2000) 335 Final (June 2000).
85. See Mark Bell, The Implementation of European Antidiscrimination Directives: Con-
verging Towards A Common Model?, 79 POL. Q. 36, 41 (2008).
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policy initiatives at the EU and national level. 86
Gender issues have figured prominently in the OMC poli-
cies which emerged from the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997. Equal
Opportunities formed one of the first four pillars of the first set
of Employment Guidelines and gender was integrated (main-
streamed) through the other three pillars in the OMC
processes.8 7 As a result the promotion of gender became a key
objective of the OMC with a number of specific equality targets
being set, for example, the female employment rate and the pro-
vision of childcare.88 However in the mid-term review of the
OMC in 2005, gender equality disappeared as a special pillar and
the objective of equal opportunities between men and women
was reduced to one guideline.89
Given the increased participation of women in paid work in
the labor market and the international dimension to feminist
politics it is understandable from both a political and economic
perspective why gender antidiscrimination measures were given
so prominent a place in the early general principles of Commu-
nity law and the social policies pursued by the Community. At
the national, European, and international levels, other suspect
classes looked on in envy at the evolving sex discrimination pro-
visions and case law and fought for the right to the same protec-
tion as gender in Community law. From the 1980s onwards the
Community took a greater interest in immigration matters, tem-
pered by a human rights perspective, on combating the rising
incidents of racism and xenophobia in Europe.9° The Treaty of
Amsterdam 1997 ushered in an important change, the inclusion
of a new Article 13 EC which significantly enhanced the suspect
86. See Council Regulation No. 1922/2006, art. 2, OJ. L 403/9, at 11 (2006).
87. See generally Fiona Beveridge, Building Against the Past: The Impact of Mainstream-
ing on EU Gender Law and Policy, 32 EUR. L. Rzv. 193 (2007).
88. See generally GENDER AND THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION (Fiona Bever-
idge & Samantha Velluti eds., 2008).
89. See generally European Commission, Report from the High Level Group
Chaired by Wim Kok, Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment
(Nov. 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok.report-en.pdf.
The review led to the creation of the Commission's "Integrated Guidelines for Growth
and Jobs (2005-2008)," comprising sixteen Guidelines with only Guideline 18 mention-
ing gender in its title. See Commission of the European Communities, Integrated
Guidelines for Growth andJobs (2005-2008), COM (2005) 141 Final, at 28 (Apr. 2005).
The counter-argument is that gender figured more prominently in the other Guide-
lines as a result of mainstreaming.
90. See generally Kahn Report, E.U. BULL., no. 6 (1994).
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classes that could be protected by Community law competence.
Article 13 EC also, and significantly, provided a legal base for
secondary implementing legislation. To date only two Directives
have been adopted with the Commission recently announcing
plans for a Directive on disability discrimination."'
One Directive, Council Directive 2000/78/EC on Equal
Treatment, is a broad general measure which has not been fully
implemented in all of the Member States.12 The Commission
sent reasoned opinions to eleven Member States on January 31,
2008 asking them to implement fully EU rules prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment and occupation on the grounds of
religion and belief, age, disability, and sexual orientation. Coun-
cil Directive 2000/43 on racial and ethnic discrimination93 was
introduced rapidly after the Member States brushed aside their
disagreements on whether and how to legislate in this area, re-
acting quickly to the election of Jorg Haider's Freedom Party in
Austria. The Directive forbids four kinds of discrimination: di-
rect, indirect, harassment, and instruction to discriminate.94 A
race equal opportunities mainstreaming policy was introduced
by Decision 2000/75 establishing an Action Programme to com-
plement the Directive. 5 A special program was adopted address-
ing the issues faced by the Roma who constitute one of the larg-
est minority groups in the EU at the 2004 enlargement.96
VIII. THE TROUBLE CASES
Under the original antidiscrimination provisions relating to
sex discrimination, the range of issues litigated was narrow, with
a core of northern and central European Member States tending
to send cases to the Court using Article 234 EC.9 7 In contrast the
91. See Press Release, European Parliament, MEPs Call for Comprehensive Com-
munity Legislation to Ban Discrimination (May 2008), available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress-page/014-29032-140-05-21-902-200805161
PR29016-19-05-2008-2008-false/default en.htm.
92. See generally Council Directive No. 2000/78/EC, O.J. L 303/16 (2000).
93. See generally Council Directive No. 2000/43/EC, O.J. L 180/22 (2000).
94. See id. art. 2.
95. See Council Decision No. 2000/750/EC, art. 1, O.J. L 303/23 (2000).
96. See generally Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, Commission
Green Paper on Equality and Non-Discrimination in an Enlarged European Union, (May 2004),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/pubicaions/2004/ke6004078_
en.pdf.
97. These were Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Denmark.
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Commission pursued very few infringement actions against the
Member States. By far the greatest interest in determining the
scope of the antidiscrimination protection were cases involving
the concept of indirect discrimination, often linked to the lack
of protection afforded to part-time work, which was carried out
predominantly by female workers." The concept was novel for
the Member States, with the exception of the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands but through the case law became an ac-
cepted norm in Community antidiscrimination measures. Other
new ideas created by "trouble cases" emerged especially where
national constitutional guarantees of equality were threatened,
for example, the idea of positive action. Positive action was men-
tioned in Article 2(4) of the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive but
was seen as derogation from the fundamental concept of equal-
ity of treatment.99 Thus, it should be interpreted restrictively
and according to the principle of proportionality. In the first
ruling on positive action, the German scheme of positive action
for the public sector that created an automatic preference for
one gender where that gender was underrepresented in the sec-
tor was held to be unlawful. The ruling created much contro-
versy, which was not dampened by a Commission communica-
tion'00 explaining that the ruling affected only certain kinds of
positive action schemes that were applied automatically when
there was underrepresentation of one gender.
As a result of the case law, which proved to be controversial
at the national level, the Member States included a permissive
concept of positive action in the new wording of Article 119 EC,
reformulated as Article 141(4) EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam
1997. In the recast equal opportunities Directive, Directive
2006/54/EC, Article 3 explicitly refers to positive action "within
the meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensur-
98. See, e.g.,Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., Case 96/80, [1981]
E.C.R. 911, 1 1-3; Kaufhaus v. Karin Weber von Hartz, Case 170/84, [19861 E.C.R.
1607, 31.
99. See Council Directive No. 76/207, art. 2(4), OJ. L 39/40 (1976).
100. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Communication on
the Interpretation of the Judgment of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case
C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, COM (96) 88 Final (Mar. 1996). In Mar-
schall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case C-409/95, [1977] E.C.R. 1-6363, the Court ac-
cepted a different form of positive action, finding that if there were reasons specific to
the male candidate to tip the balance in his favor on recruitment, these reasons could
take precedence over the positive action provisions.
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ing full equality in practice between men and women in working
life." '' This suggests that positive action is now seen as a consti-
tutional principle and not as derogation from the equal treat-
ment provisions of Community law.10 2 In cases decided after the
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 came into force the Court has taken
different approaches. It allowed a positive action scheme using a
quota system to be effective in Badeck v. Hessischer Ministerprd-
sident,1°3 but not a scheme that allowed a woman to be ap-
pointed over a more highly qualified male candidate for the post
where women were underrepresented."°4 In Lommers v. Minister
van Landbouw, the Court allowed a childcare scheme to favor
female staff, over male employees. 0 5
Not surprisingly inequality of treatment linked to pregnancy
and maternity issues also began to emerge as a greater number
of European women attempted to combine paid work with
motherhood. The Court created a link between pregnancy dis-
crimination and direct gender discrimination in a groundbreak-
ing judgment in Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong
Volwassenen.1°6 The Court held that by refusing to employ a
101. See Council Directive No. 2006/54, art. 3, O.J. L 204/23 (2006).
102. See generally Burrows & Robinson, supra note 77.
103. See Badeck v. Hessischer Ministerprasident, Case C-158/97, [2000] E.C.R. I-
1875, 4.
104. See Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, Case C-407/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5539, 2.
105. See Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Case C-476/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-2891,
50.
106. See, e.g., Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voorJong Volwassenen, Case
C-177/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-03941; Mahlburg v. Land Mecklenberg-Vorpommern, Case
207/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-549. The Court extended Dekker to a situation where the em-
ployer refused to appoint a pregnant woman on statutory grounds. Cf Hertz v. Aldi,
Case C-179/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-03979, 19. The Court did not extend the Dekker prin-
ciple beyond the period of pregnancy and maternity leave. If an illness associated with
the pregnancy continued after the period of maternity leave, the illness was to be
treated as an "ordinary" illness. The woman should compare her situation with that of a
man who was absent from work due to illness. However, this comparison is difficult to
apply. First, courts have split on the issue of whether time off from work should include
a period of illness during maternity absence. Compare Larsson v. Fotex Supermarket,
Case C-400/95, [1977] E.C.R. 1-2757, with Brown v. Rentokil Ltd., Case C-394/96,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-4185. Second, courts did not afford the Dekker protection where a wo-
man is absent from work before the start of her maternity leave as a result of routine
medical complaints but not related to the actual pathological condition of pregnancy
or an increased risk to the unborn child. See Pedersen v. Kvickly Skive, Case C-66/96,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-7327, 5. More recent rulings have held that an employer may not take
steps to dismiss a woman on the grounds related to the birth of a child for the duration
of her maternity leave. See Paquay v. Societe d'architectes Hoet Minne SPRL, Case C
460/06, [2007] E.C.R. 1-8511, 2.
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pregnant woman the employer was committing an act of per se
direct discrimination. There was no necessity to show that she
had been treated less favorably than a man who was "similarly
situated" (usually the parallel for comparison was a man absent
from work because of sickness).1° 7 In Webb v. EMO Cargo the
Court extended the Dekker principles to the dismissal of a preg-
nant woman. l 8 In Busch v. Klinikum Neustadt the Court held
that an employer was committing direct discrimination by not
allowing a woman to return to work before the end of her paren-
tal leave on the ground that she was pregnant for a second
time.1"9 This case law that resulted in a broad platform of rights,
paved the way for a Community-wide minimum set of employ-
ment-related protective rights for women who are pregnant and
have recently given birth1 and a Parental Leave Directive."'
However these rights were not included in the modernization
process that culminated in Directive 2006/54/EC.
The recognition of a set of pregnancy and maternity rights
has in turn led the Court to combine ideas of equal treatment
with employment protection based upon the non-discrimination
principle in the recent ruling in Mayr v. Bdckerei und Konditorei
Fleickner OHG.112 Here a woman who was undergoing in vitro
fertilization was dismissed while on a medically certified sick
leave. At the date of her dismissal, ova taken from the woman
had been fertilized with her partner's sperm cells but the fertil-
ized ova were not transferred into the woman's uterus until
three days after the notice of dismissal. The Court ruled that the
woman did not enjoy protection from dismissal under Article
107. See Dekker, [1990] E.C.R. 1-03941, 12.
108. See Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., Case 32/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3567,
21; see also Hertz, [1990] E.C.R. 1-03979, 13; Brown, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4185, 16, 25-26.
109. See generally Busch v. Klinikum Neustadt, Case C-320/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-2041.
110. See generally Council Directive No. 92/85, O.J. L 348/1 (1992). These would
be known as a "floor of rights" in the United Kingdom. The idea is that employers
guarantee a basic set of rights to all employees. Individual employers could also pro-
vide additional rights through occupational schemes. A weakness of the approach is
that the "floor of rights" is not universal. The general scheme had qualifying thresholds
usually based on the number of hours employees worked each week. This was a source
of conflict in the negotiations over the Pregnant Workers' Directive. The Directive pro-
vided a low ceiling to rights and a bare minimum in the absence of more generous
occupational schemes.
111. See Council Directive No. 96/34, art. 2, OJ. L 145/4 (1996).
112. See generally Mayr v. Backerei und Konditorei Fldckner OHG, Case C-506/06,
[2008] E.C.R. 646.
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10 (1) of Council Directive 92/85/EEC but that Articles 2 (1) and
5(1) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC would provide protection
against dismissal of a female worker who was at an advanced
stage of in vitro fertilization when it is shown that the dismissal is
based on the fact that the woman has undergone fertilization
treatment.'
1 3
The European Ombudsman has applied the Court's case
law on pregnancy discrimination to a staff dispute concerning
the European Parliament's refusal to change the date of the ac-
cess competition for a woman who was due to give birth at the
time of the competition.114 The Ombudsman recognized the
fundamental rights nature of the equal treatment principle,
combined with other fundamental rights such as the respect for
a private and family life." 5
Similarly, the basic constitutional provision of equal pay for
work of equal value, Article 141 EC, has been used to challenge
inequalities and unfair treatment in pay issues associated with
maternity pay and leave. However, the Court appears to have
created a special regime for maternity pay by holding that a wo-
man on maternity leave was not entitled to equal pay with other
workers but was entitled to an adequate amount of maternity
pay. 1 16 Soft law initiatives have created a new discourse on rec-
onciling work and family life, finding more concrete expression
in the OMC processes of the Lisbon Strategy.
In relation to other controversial areas the Court has dis-
played a mixed response. In P v. S, 17 for example, the Court
was willing to apply the general principle of non-discrimination
to a gender reassignment, proclaiming the fundamental rights
113. See id. 50-52.
114. See generally European Ombudsman Draft Recommendation, Complaint No.
3278/2004/ELB (Aug. 6, 2006), available at http://ombudsman.europa.eu/recom-
men/en/043278.htm.
115. See, e.g., X v. Commission, Case C-404/92 P, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4737; Carpenter
v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-60/00, [2002] E.C.R. 6279.
116. See Gillespie v. Northern Health Services Bd. & Social Services Bd., Case C-
342/93, [19961 E.C.R. 1-475, 20; see also Boyle v. Equal Opportunities Comm., Case C-
411/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-6401; Lewen v. Denda, Case C-333/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-7243,
15 (holding that employers can refuse bonuses to a pregnant woman if the woman was
on maternity leave). But see CNAVTS v. Thibault, Case C-136/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2011,
7 29, 32-33 (stating that employers can not automatically deny promotion to a woman
just because of her maternity leave). This protection is now found in Article 15 in the
revised Council Directive No. 2006/54/EC, O.J. L 204/23.
117. Pv.S Case 13/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2143.
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nature of the principle. But, in Grant v. South-West Trains, the
Court was restrained, holding that the principle of non-discrimi-
nation could not be applied to same-sex partnerships in the ab-
sence of national or Community legislation.11 The Court was
concerned not to invade the sphere of national competence to
legislate on family law and personal status. The inclusion of sex-
ual orientation as a suspect class of antidiscrimination protection
in Article 13 EC paved the way for the Court to rule that the
refusal to grant a survivor's pension to a same-sex surviving
spouse from a registered same-sex partnership is direct discrimi-
nation.11 9 However, the Court was eager to stress that its use of
the antidiscrimination principle was not an interference with the
Member State's competence to regulate family law.1 2 °
IX. RACE DISCRIMINATION
The many arguments 2 1 raised for introducing a parallel
form of protection against race discrimination were answered
with the adoption of a specific Directive addressing race discrim-
ination, Directive 2000/43/EC. 1 22 The Directive prohibits dis-
crimination on the ground of racial or ethnic origin and applies
to discrimination in the labor market as well as the supply of
services such as housing, healthcare, and education.1 23 The Di-
rective was to be transposed into national laws by 2003; however,
it was not until 2006 that all of the Member States had intro-
duced the Directive in one form or another. 1 24 The Commission
found many instances where the national laws did not measure
up to the obligations contained in the Directive and has initiated
infringement proceedings, resulting in positive judgments from
118. See Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., Case C-249/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-621, 50;
see also D & Sweden v. Council, Joined Cases 122/99 P & 125/99 P, [2001] E.C.R. I-
4319.
119. See Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bfahnen, Case C-267/06,
(ECJ Apr. 1, 2008) (not yet reported). "The case is . . . part of the long process of
accepting homosexuality, which is a vital step towards achieving equality and respect for
all human beings." Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Case C-267/06,
2 (ECJ Apr. 1, 2008).
120. See id. 1 59.
121. See Erika Szyszczak, Race Discrimination: The Limits of Market Equality?, in Dis-
CRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAw 127, 127-29 (Bob Hepple & Erika M. Szyszczak eds.,
1992).
122. See Council Directive No. 2000/43/EC, art. 1, O.J. L 180 (2000).
123. See id. art. 1-3, O.J. L 180, at 4-5 (2000).
124. See id. art. 16, O.J. L 180, at 9 (2000).
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the Court.1 25 It would seem that the initial enthusiasm for the
Directive was lost in the post 9/11 world, where a new set of
issues emerged on the political agenda. The range of infringe-
ment allegations reveals why so few cases have emerged in the
national courts given the imprecise and inconsistent implemen-
tation of the Directive into national legal systems without a cul-
ture for legislating in the area. The Court is consistent in stating
that Community law should be applied through national proce-
dural rules 126 and that there is no specific duty upon national
courts to create new causes of action in the absence of specific
national rules. This position creates difficulties where there are
insufficient national structures in place to trigger test case litiga-
tion. The default protection provided by the ability to sue the
State under the Francovich v. Italy12 7 principles is equally difficult
to trigger, with few Francovich actions emerging generally, along-
side the difficulty of finding the right litigant to show the harm
caused by the failure to implement the Community Directives
correctly. To date, only nine cases based upon the new Direc-
tives have been sent to the Court using Article 234 EC, with only
one relating to race discrimination. 128 This is surprising from an
academic perspective since there is a long history of demanding
race discrimination protection through law in Europe and there
are many issues and questions that need answering through a
125. A new set of infringement proceedings were initiated in 2008. These were
against: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Hungary, Malta,
the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden. The national legislation is allegedly limited in
terms of the people and areas it covers, as compared to the Directive (for example, lack
of protection for civil servants or in access to self-employment); the definitions of dis-
crimination which diverge from the Directive (in particular, in terms of indirect dis-
crimination, harassment and instructions to discriminate); the lack of proper imple-
mentation of the obligation for employers to provide reasonable accommodation for
disabled workers; inconsistencies in the provisions designed to help victims of discrimi-
nation (such as the shifting of the burden of proof, the rights of associations to assist
individuals with their cases, and the protection against victimization). See European Par-
liament, Report on Progress Made in Equal Opportunities and Non-discrimination in
the EU (the Transposition of Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC), Opinion of
the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs, 1 2 (Apr. 2008), available
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&
reference=A6-2008-0159&language=EN.
126. See generally Unibet (London) Ltd v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007]
E.C.R. 1-2271.
127. See Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5537,
1 3340.
128. See generally Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v.
Firma Feryn NV, Case C-54/07, (ECJ July 10, 2008) (not yet reported).
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dialogue between national courts and the ECJ. A burning ques-
tion is whether the wealth of principles and ideas that have been
settled through the gender discrimination provisions should be
read across into the new antidiscrimination classes of protection.
From the little litigation that has emerged, a hierarchy appears
to be in the mind of the Court where age129 and disability 3 ' dis-
crimination does not appear not to be afforded to the same level
of protection as gender discrimination.
X. A NEW APPROACH: REVISITING ANTIDISCRIMINATION
AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF COMMUNITY LAW
The Court appeared to enhance the role the general princi-
ple of equality may play in a in a case involving alleged age dis-
crimination against a person employed upon a fixed term con-
tract. 13 ' The case was a private (or horizontal) dispute between
an employer and employee and concerned an allegation of a
breach of the fixed term work Directive and the general discrim-
ination Directive, 2000/78/EC. 3 2 The discrimination alleged
was on the grounds of age, contrary to Directive 2000/78/EC
but the transitional period for the Directive had not expired at
the time of the dispute.' 33 Looking first at the fixed term work
Directive, the German implementation of Framework Agree-
129. See Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, Case C-411/05, [2007] E.C.R.
1-8531, 31, 33; see also Erica Howard, The Case for a Considered Hierarchy of Discrimina-
tion Grounds in EU Law, 13 MAASTRICHTJ. EUR. & COMp. LAw 445 (2006); see generally L.
Waddington & Mark Bell, More Equal Than Others Than Others: Distinguishing European
Union Equality Directives, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 587 (2001).
130. See Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, Case C-13/05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6467,
18-22.
131. See generally Mangold v. Helm, Case C-144/04, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9981.
132. See generally Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgerate (BSH) Altersffirsorge
GmbH, Case C-427/06 (ECJ Sept. 23, 2008) (not yet reported). The Advocate General
in Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgerate (BSH) Altersffirsorge GmbH points out that the
dispute in Mangold was essentially attacking the underlying German law, which had
implemented Community Law Directive. However, the Court also comments,
[i]n Mangold the Court applied the general principle of equal treatment (in-
cluding equal treatment irrespective of age) to a private dispute between indi-
viduals, albeit one governed by national rules of public law put in place to
implement a Community law obligation (Directive 1999/70). It therefore
seems that I should be slow to exclude the possibility that a general principle
of Community law may, in appropriate circumstances, be applied horizontally.
Id. 85.
133. See id. 6 (stating that the directive was to be implemented by December 2,
2006).
2009] 649
650 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:624
ment 1999 on fixed term work gave no protection for workers
aged fifty-two or over. 134 The Court found that the German law
implementing the Directive could give rise to age discrimination
and although the German government had a legitimate aim in
mind when it implemented the Directive (the aim of achieving
flexibility in labor markets by creating job opportunities for
younger workers), the German method of implementing the
public interest aim in this case did not satisfy the principle of
proportionality. 1 35 The Court then, at Paragraphs 75 and 76,
recognized that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds
of age was a general principle of Community law:
The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age must
thus be regarded as a general principle of Community law.
Where national rules fall within the scope of Community law
... and reference is made to the Court for a preliminary rul-
ing, the Court must provide all the criteria of interpretation
needed by the national court to determine whether those
rules are compatible with such a principle (Case C-442/00
Rodrfguez Caballero [2002] ECR 1-11915, paragraphs 30 to
32).1 - 6
Consequently, observance of the general principle of equal
treatment, in particular in respect of age, cannot as such be
conditional upon the expiry of the period allowed the Mem-
ber States for the transposition of a directive intended to lay
down a general framework for combating discrimination on
the grounds of age, in particular so far as the organization of
appropriate legal remedies, the burden of proof, protection
against victimization, social dialogue, affirmative action, and
other specific measures to implement such a directive are
concerned.1
37
The Court concluded that, irrespective of the deadline for im-
plementing the Directive 2000/78:
[I] t is the responsibility of the national court to guarantee the
full effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimina-
tion in respect of age, setting aside any provision of national
law which may conflict with Community law.'
3 8
134. See Mangold, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9981, 18-19.
135. See id. 7 58-60.
136. Id. 75.
137. Id. 76.
138. Id. 78.
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The Court thus places the duty upon the national court to inter-
pret national law to ensure compatibility with Community law,
guaranteeing Community law rights for all individuals. The
thrust of the judgment is one of effectiveness. The Mangold v.
Helm approach has been criticized by Advocates General139 and
by academic commentators.140 In Lindorfer v. Council,14 a staff
case, Advocate General Sharpston examined how Directive
2000/78 fits into the scheme of Community law on non-discrimi-
nation. The Advocate General took the view that a better read-
ing of Mangold is not that Community law contained a specific
pre-existing principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age
but that discrimination on such grounds had always been pre-
cluded by the general principle of equality. 14 2 Thus, Directive
2000/78 introduced a specific, detailed framework for dealing
with age (and indeed other suspect classes) of discrimination.
139. See Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgerdite (BSH) Altersffirsorge GmbH,
Case C-427/06, slip op., 31-33 (ECJ Sept. 23, 2008) (not yet reported); see also
Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, Case C-411/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-8531 (argu-
ing that the international instruments and constitutional traditions referred to by the
ECJ in Mangold v. Helm embrace the general principle of equal treatment, but that the
Court appears to jump too far in its reasoning to infer that from the existence of these
standards there is a specific prohibition against age discrimination); cf Navas v. Eurest
Colectividades SA, Case C-13/05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6467 (concerned with the potentially
far-reaching economic and financial consequences of claims to equal treatment based
on Article 13 EC). In each case, the Court did not comment on the criticisms raised
against Mangold.
140. See generally Alan Dashwood, From Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: Reduc-
ing Direct Effect to Absurdity?, 9 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. L. 81 (2006); see also Joel Cavallini,
De la Suppression des Restrictions d la Conclusion d'un Contrat 4 Durge Ddterminie Lorsque le
Salarig est un Senior, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE SOCIALE 25 (2005); Olivier Dubos, La Cour de
Justice, le Renvoi Prijudiciel, l'Invocabilitg des Directives: de lApostasie d l'HrIsie?, LA SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE SOCIALE, 1295 (2006); 0. LeClerc, Le Contrat de Travail des Seniors d ltpreuve
du Droit Communautaire, RECUEIL DALLOZ 557 (2006); M. Nicolella, Une Application An-
ticipge des Directives non Transposies?, GAZETrE DU PALAIs, 22 (2006); Edouard Dubout, On
Mangold, REVUE DEs Affaires Europ~ennes 723 (2005); A. Masson & C. Micheau, The
Werner Mangold Case: An Example of Legal Militancy, EUR. PUB. L. 587 (2007); Editorial
Comments, COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1 (2006); cf Malcolm Ross, Effectiveness in the Euro-
pean legal Order(s): Beyond Supremacy to Constituional Proportionality, 31 EUR. L. REv. 476
(2006) (arguing that while Directives do not confer rights on individuals directly they
do impose obligations upon the Member States that create secondary consequences for
non-State parties. Thus cases such as Mangold seek to promote and maximize the prin-
ciple of the effectiveness of Community law wherever possible while not explicitly creat-
ing horizontal direct effect for Directives).
141. Lindorfer v. Council, Case C-427/06 P [2007] E.C.R. 1-6767 (cited in Centrum
voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, Case C-54/07,
slip op., 58 (ECJ July 10, 2008) (not yet reported)).
142. See Bartsch, slip op., 34.
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The Court did not address this point its judgment. Advocate
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer has taken the view in Maruko v.
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Biihnen that the "essential charac-
ter" of the right to non-discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation is of a different order to that which the Court attrib-
uted to the principle of non-discrimination based on age in Man-
gold. 4 ' In Coleman v. Attridge Law, Advocate General Maduro de-
scribes the interpretation of Mangold as a "practical aspect of the
principle of equality." '144 The Court has the opportunity to re-
visit the issue in a pending case, Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens
Hausgerdte (BSH) Altersfiirsorge GmbH.145  Advocate General
Sharpston has argued that the substantive issue of the dispute
does not fall within Community law competence.
XI. TIME TO MOVE ON... BUT WHERE TO?
The success of a policy on antidiscrimination cannot be
measured entirely in the amount of litigation it generates and
the raw statistical evidence from Europe suggests that the antidis-
crimination policy of the Community has resulted only in partial
changes to the way European society organizes itself economi-
cally, politically, and socially. As in the United States, law plays
an important role in generating a new discourse about how a
community should value its members. The impact of the new
raft of Article 13 EC measures has yet to be seen, with the Mem-
ber States dragging out the implementation of the secondary law
and few references making their way to the ECJ. With only nine
references sent by the national courts using Article 234 EC, the
result is an uneven and disappointing development of anti-dis-
crimination concepts with disagreement evident within the
Court. Yet the litigation, which continues around the older set
of anti-discrimination provisions, reveals that the Court is recep-
tive to expanding the existing provisions to allow for greater op-
portunities. These opportunities are not only for antidiscrimina-
tion to be developed as a concept but also for the practical reali-
143. See generally Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bfihnen, Case C-
267/06 (ECJ Apr. 1, 2008) (not yet reported).
144. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Coleman v. Attridge Law &
Steve Law, Case C-303/06, slip op. 8 (ECJ Jan. 31, 2008) (not yet reported).
145. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens
Hausgerdte (BSH) Altersffirsorge GmbH, Case 427/06, slip op., 1 (ECJ May 22, 2008)
(not yet reported).
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zation of equal opportunity to continue to emerge. For
example, in Lommers, the Court accepted the legality of a subsi-
dized child-care scheme which was available mainly for female
employees, recognizing that women were, in reality the principal
caretakers of children, and this role created difficulties in recon-
ciling work and family life. 14 6 In Kiiski v. Tampereen Kaupunki, a
woman who had given birth in 2003 was granted child-care leave
from August 2004 until June 2005.147 During this leave she be-
came pregnant again and asked for the original leave to be
amended to end on December 22, 2004 so that she could gener-
ate a second set of maternity and child-care leave arrangements
for herself and transfer the first set to her partner. 14' This re-
quest was rejected by the employer who argued that the Finnish
collective agreement and case law allowed an amendment of an
original request for child-care leave only if there was a funda-
mental change in the conditions in which she could care for her
child; a new pregnancy was not such a condition.14 The father
of the child was not allowed to take childcare leave because
under the collective agreement only one parent could take the
leave at a given time. The Court accepted that Ms. Kiiski wanted
to interrupt her leave to enable her to take maternity leave and
transfer the child-care leave to the father.
This embedding of equal opportunity has taken many years
to be realized through the use of soft law, hard law, and most
importantly, case law. There are discernible tendencies in the
language of the legislation and the case law for a move towards
more substantive notions of equality, using the principle of an-
tidiscrimination combined with positive action approaches. 150
In order for other forms of antidiscrimination to achieve the
same status, the Community cannot endure such a long
timeframe. Equally the Community rests upon traditional and
largely uncontroversial notions of direct and indirect discrimina-
tion, with a limited acknowledgement of positive action. It ur-
146. See Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Case C-476/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-2829,
16.
147. See Kiiski v. Tampereen Kaupunki, Case 116/06, [2007] E.C.R. 1-7643, 9 17.
148. See id. 9 18-19.
149. See id. 19.
150. See generally Erica Howard, The European Year of Equal Opportunities for All-
2007: Is the EU Moving Away From a Formal Idea of Equality, 14(2) EuR. LJ. 168 (2008)
(discussing the EU's directives on fighting discrimination and promoting equality and
equal treatment).
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gently needs a new generation of ideas given the complexity of
modern life. There are some hints that this new generation of
ideas can emerge through the traditional case law approach.
For example, Advocate General Maduro in an Opinion in Cole-
man 1 51 opened the door for moving the discrimination concept
forward, firstly by extending the ambit to protect a person who is
associated with one of the suspect categories, in this case disabil-
ity, because of her caring responsibilities, and secondly, by link-
ing the purpose of discrimination law to realizing personal au-
tonomy, and an empowering principle, rather than seeing dis-
crimination in a passive sense of providing protection from the
victimization which is often ingrained in discriminatory behav-
ior. This idea is set out in paragraph 11:
[A] commitment to autonomy means that people must not be
deprived of valuable options in areas of fundamental impor-
tance for their lives by reference to suspect classifications. Ac-
cess to employment and professional development are of fun-
damental significance for every individual, not merely as a
means of earning one's living but also as an important way of
self-fulfillment and realisation of one's potential. The dis-
criminator who discriminates against an individual belonging
to a suspect classification unjustly deprives her of valuable op-
tions. As a consequence, that person's ability to lead an au-
tonomous life is seriously compromised since an important
aspect of her life is shaped not by her own choices but by the
prejudice of someone else. By treating people belonging to
these groups less well because of their characteristic, the dis-
criminator prevents them from exercising their autonomy. At
this point, it is fair and reasonable for anti-discrimination law
to intervene. In essence, by valuing equality and committing
ourselves to realising equality through the law, we aim at sus-
taining for every person the conditions for an autonomous
life. 15 2
The case concerned the mother of a child with serious disabili-
ties. She claimed that she was discriminated against by her em-
ployer (a law firm) after she returned to work from maternity
leave and subsequently during her employment when she re-
quired time off work to care for her child. 53 The behavior of
151. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Coleman v. Attridge Law,
Case 303/06, slip op. 10-11 (ECJ Jan. 31, 2008) (not yet reported).
152. Id. 11.
153. See id. 3.
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the employer (and co-workers) was a form of harassment and
may have been covered by an expansive interpretation of the
protection of "family status" under the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive. Instead, the claim was brought under the British Disability
Discrimination Act and Council Directive 2000/78 on equal
treatment. Her argument was that the Directive was intended to
prohibit discrimination not only against disabled persons but
also against individuals who are victims of discrimination be-
cause they are associated with a disabled person.154 The Advo-
cate General takes a teleological approach by looking behind the
purpose of Article 13 EC:
Article 13 EC is an expression of the commitment of the
Community legal order to the principle of equal treatment
and non-discrimination. Thus, any interpretation of both
that article and any directive adopted under this legal basis
must be undertaken against the background of the Court's
case-law on these principles. The Directive itself states in Arti-
cle 1 that its purpose is 'to lay down a general framework for
combating discrimination ... with a view to putting into ef-
fect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.'
The Court's case-law is clear as regards the role of equal treat-
ment and non-discrimination in the Community legal order.
Equality is not merely a political ideal and aspiration but one
of the fundamental principles of Community law. As the
Court held in Mangold the Directive constitutes a practical as-
pect of the principle of equality. In order to determine what
equality requires in any given case it is useful to recall the
values underlying equality. These are human dignity and per-
sonal autonomy. 55
While the language of this Opinion moves Community law think-
ing further than has hitherto been seen in the judgments of the
Court, it also echoes the much earlier sentiments of the ILO
Conventions, discussed above, of examining the purpose of the
law relating to antidiscrimination, relating it to the dignity of the
individual. This approach is also seen in a subsequent Opinion
by the same Advocate General in Centrum voor gelijkheid van kan-
sen en voor racismebestrijding v. NV Firma Feryn,1 56 the first refer-
154. See id. 4.
155. See id. 8 (citations omitted).
156. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Centrum voor Gelijkheid
van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, Case C-54/07, slip op., 9,
14, 17 (ECJ Mar. 12, 2008) (not yet reported).
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ence to the Court using the concept of direct discrimination in
Council Directive 2000/43/EC. 157 Here an employer had used
directly discriminatory selection criteria stating that (allegedly)
in response to his customers' wishes he would only employ indig-
enous fitters from Belgium to install his products in customers'
homes. 158 The case appears quite shocking for an English (or
indeed an American) reader, since it recalls the overt discrimina-
tion seen in the notices of "no blacks wanted" in employment,
housing and the services sector which drew the response of the
initial antidiscrimination legislation of the 1960s and the early
debates as to whether the antidiscrimination principle could ex-
tend to the "private" sphere of services, housing and personal
employment in the home.159
The case raises many new issues at the European level on
the standard of proof. The employer had appeared on television
and placed earlier notices explaining his employment hiring pol-
icy and had issued ajoint press release with the national body for
combating discrimination. The case also raises issues of proof of
indirect discrimination. Can the fact that the employer does not
employ anyone from an ethnic minority give rise to a presump-
tion of indirect discrimination? Is one factual situation enough
to raise a presumption of discrimination? Conversely, can the
employer escape liability by stating that one employee does have
an ethnic background and making a declaration reversing the
earlier declaration to state that employees from an ethnic minor-
ity background are indeed welcome to apply for jobs? Again,
Advocate General Maduro looks to the purpose and reasons be-
hind Article 13 EC. He introduces another novel idea into Euro-
pean law, the idea of "speech acts."' 6 ° This would cover the situ-
ation where no physical or discernible act of discrimination has
taken place against a specific individual but where the act of say-
ing something amounts to the carrying out of an act.
These two cases throw down the gauntlet to move antidis-
crimination law into a new era of individual and collective rights.
The cases since 2000, when the implementing Directives of Arti-
cle 13 EC were introduced, have been limited to a number of
157. See Council Directive No. 2000/43/EC, arts. 2-3, OJ. L 180/22, at 24 (2000).
158. See Centrum, slip op., 16.
159. See generally Centrum, slip op.
160. See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Centrum, slip op., 16,
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formal infringement actions and a handful of ad hoc Article 234
EC references. More coordinated strategic litigation needs to
take place in order to get to the heart of a number of key con-
cepts in the new areas of suspect classes protected by the antidis-
crimination concept. These issues should discuss whether the
same principles can be read across all of the suspect classes:
when does the reversal of the burden of proof apply, is segrega-
tion a form of direct and/or indirect discrimination, what is the
role of positive action, what are effective remedies, what are ap-
propriate remedies for victimization complaints?
The increase in social law and social policy in the Commu-
nity after 1997 has created a wide platform of hard and soft law
policy fora. Paradoxically this can open up new opportunities
but also create competition for the use of the fora by different
policy actors. This is seen for example in October 2007 when
the Commission indicated in its Legislative and Work Pro-
gramme for 2008 that it was necessary, in the light of Article 13
EC, to adopt a new antidiscrimination Directive providing pro-
tection for all the suspect classes covered by Article 13 EC.16'
Yet, disappointingly, in the subsequent proposal the Commission
only focused upon disability discrimination, an area where rep-
resentation in the "civil society" of Community policy-making is
articulate, professionally prepared, and highly organized. 162
Gazing at a crystal ball is always a risk. My guess is that what
the next fifty years will hold for antidiscrimination law in Europe
will depend upon how far existing law and policy is able to sus-
tain the changes in society, especially the role of women in the
public workplace and men in the private sphere of family life,
against growing, and what could be countervailing factors of
multiculturalism in Europe and the impact this has on the or-
ganization of private and public life. Race and ethnic discrimi-
nation, together with political rights on freedom of speech and
belief, will dominate the public agenda on how antidiscrimina-
tion is handled in Europe. This political, and legal, debate will
take place against the countervailing, and often repressive,
growth of racism and xenophobia in the uncertain economic cli-
161. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE COMMISSION'S WORK PROGRAMME FOR 2008
25, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/index_en.htm.
162. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE REPORT 2008 at 1, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/index en.htm.
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mate and the political measures taken in the "War on Terror."
These will be the main challenges as to how far European society
is able to uphold the constitutional values proclaimed judicially
by the European Court and politically by the TEU and TFEU
created by the Treaty of Lisbon 2007. To end on a note of opti-
mism, read the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Kadi. 163
A resident of Saudi Arabia, Kadi, was designated by the UN Se-
curity Council Sanctions Committee as a person suspected of
supporting terrorism. Under United Nations Resolutions, the
Member States of the United Nations are required to freeze the
funds and financial resources of such suspects. The Community
gave effect to these obligations in Council Regulation (EC No.
1881/2002) that included, in an annex, a renewable list of per-
sons deemed to fall within the United Nations Sanctions Com-
mittee list of people suspected of supporting terrorism.1 64 Kadi
brought an action before the Court of First Instance for the an-
nulment of EC Regulation No 1881/2002, claiming that the
Council lacked competence to adopt it and that the Regulation
breached several personal fundamental rights, for example, the
right to property and the right to a fair hearing. 165 The Court of
First Instance rejected all of Kadi's pleas and the case is now on
appeal to the ECJ. 6 6 Advocate General Maduro, in finding that
the Regulation is a reviewable act, also found that Kadi's funda-
mental rights had been infringed:
Both the right to be heard and the right to effective judicial
review constitute fundamental rights that form part of the
general principles of Community law. According to settled
case-law, 'observance of the right to be heard is, in all pro-
ceedings initiated against a person which are liable to
culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fun-
damental principle of Community law which must be guaran-
teed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceed-
ings in question .... That principle requires that the address-
ees of decisions which significantly affect their interests
should be placed in a position in which they may effectively
make known their views.' As to the right to effective judicial
review, the Court has held: 'The European Community is...
163. See generally Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Kadi v. Council,
Case C-402/05 P (ECJ Jan. 16, 2008) (not yet reported).
164. See Council Directive No. 881/2002, Annex 1, O.J. L 139/9, at 12 (2002).
165. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Kadi, slip op., 8-9.
166. See id. 9.
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a community based on the rule of law in which its institutions
are subject to judicial review of the compatibility of their acts
with the Treaty and with the general principles of law which
include fundamental rights.... Individuals are therefore en-
titled to effective judicial protection of the rights they derive
from the Community legal order, and the right to such pro-
tection is one of the general principles of law stemming from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States.' 
167
167. See id. 49 (citations omitted).
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